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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

ARA OTTESON and NELLIE A.
OTTESON, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.

Case No. 15478

RICHARD D. MALONE and HILA
SUE MALONE, husband and wife,
Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION IN OPPOSITION
TO PETITION AND BRIEF FOR REHEARING
BY PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS

Defendants-Appellants contend that the Utah State Supreme
Court was well within its province to reverse and remand the
decision of the trial court and to instruct that the defendantsappellants be permitted specific performance of the Lease and
Option.
Justice Maughn, writing for the court, well summarized the
circumstances of the instant case:
"There is no evidence of fraud, misrepresentation, or over-reaching on the part of the defendants,
and the plaintiffs are bound by the contract they engaged.

The language of the Lease and Option was plain and unambiguo,;:
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The parties had reduced an agreement to writing after
negotiations, and after careful thought had been given
to its formation and drafting.
A written contract duly entered into should be
regarded with some sanctity; and its commitments can
only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence.

In

view of the situation here, where there were prior
negotiations,

the furnishing of the preliminary copy,

as well as an amended one, with ample opportunity to
read,

(the defective hearing of Mr. Otteson thus becom-

ing unpersuasive)

coupled with the later signing, and

other circumstances shown,

I cannot see wherein a fair

and reasonable conclusion could be drawn that the Ottesons
proved by clear and convincing evidence that they had not
understood and agreed to the contract as they signed it."
This is completely in keeping with the trial court's position.
The trial court judge, on page 123 of the transcript, prohibited
counsel for defendants from further probing matters of fraud, misrepresentation, and undue influence, and counseled as follows:
"Well,

haven't I said that I didn't think there was

any undue influence or any fraud or any misrepresentation?
I thought I said that had to be shown by clear and convincing evidence,

and I

found no such evidence here, so I don't

think we need to concern ourselves about that."
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The lower court, while admitting that the proof should be
clear and convincing, did not follow through with that standard
in its decision.
Despite an amount of contradictory testimony at trial, ther.
still remained a large body of uncontroverted evidence supportet'
by statements by both sides of the controversy.

The following

are a few examples:
(1)

Mr. Otteson testified that he had at least two

ferences with the Malones regarding the Lease and Option
before it was ever drafted.
(2)

had,

page 42)

Mr. Otteson testified that his eyesight was good

and that he could read.
(3)

(Trial transcript,

(Trial transcript,

page 43)

Mr. Otteson testified that both of the plaintiffs

in fact,

read the Lease and Option.

(Trial transcript

page 45 and 46)
(4)

Mr. Otteson testified that he discussed the

first draft of the Lease and Option with the Malones.
(Trial transcript,
( 5)

page 72)

Mr. Otteson testified that both he and his wife

read the second draft of the Lease and Option.
transcript,

(Trial

page 82)

The testimonies

of both Mr. and Mrs. Malone affirm that the

Ottesons had ample opportunity to understand what they were sigi.l~
Both appellants testified that the first draft of the instrument::.
ase payment'
returned specifically to clarify the provision that le
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were to be applied to the purchase price.

There can be little

question that careful thought had gone into the formation of the
contract.

Mr. Bunnell, the attorney who prepared both drafts of

the Lease and Option, testified that Mrs. Otteson contacted him to
do the work and that he charged her for the services.

The logical

inference is that the respondents were as well protected in their
dealings, if not better protected, that were the Malones.

The

Ottesons had Mr. Bunnell at their disposal throughout the final
preparations of the contract; if they truly had any serious misgivings about what they had read, Mr. Bunnell could have readily
answered their questions.
Justice Maughn, in his opinion, speaks somewhat of the "sanctity"
of unambiguous contracts.
general contract law.

This concept is heavily buttressed by

In this regard, the authors of 49 AM JUR 2d

Contracts, Section 149, pages 498 and 499, state:
"It is the duty of every contracting party to learn
and know its contents before he signs and delivers it,
and if the contract is plain and unequivocal in its
terms, he is ordinarily bound thereby.

To permit a

party, when sued on a written contract, to admit that
he signed it but to deny that it expresses the agreement he made or to allow him to admit that he signed it
but did not read it or know its stipulations, would
absolutely destroy the value of all contracts.

This

rule has been carried to the extent of holding that in
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the absence of fraud or circumstances savoring a fraud,
one entering into a contract which refers for some of
its terms to an extraneous document, outside the contract
proper, is bound also thereby, notwithstanding he admits
to inform himself as to the contents of that document or
the nature of those terms and conditions when it is passible for him to do so."
The trial court permitted into evidence a great deal of
testimony from the plaintiffs regarding what they thought the
Lease and Option meant.

Considering that the trial court had

already barred the possibility of fraud,

misrepresentation, and

undue influence, and also considering that the Lease and Option
was the final product of extensive negotiations between the part!'
the court should have given no consideration whatsoever to the pa:
testimony of the Ottesons.

I t is well

substantiated by other ter1

mony that the plaintiffs choice to sign the Lease and Option was:,
spur-of-the-moment decision.

It came only after weeks of negoti:·

tions and two professionally drafted documents.

If the defendan'· 1

appellants cannot be protected in their contractual expectations
after so forthright of an approach as that which they took in thi'
case, one can only wonder what a party would have to do to formul:
a valid contract.
Perhaps the best definition of the illusive phrase, "Clear
1

and convincing" evidence is to be found in Greener vs. Green_!!'.• :,
P2d 194 (1949):

'
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"But for a matter to be clear and convincing to a
particular mind, it must at least have reached the
point where there remains no serious or substantial
doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion.

A mind

which was of the opinion that it was convinced and yet
which entertained, not a slight, but a reasonable
doubt as to the correctness of its conclusion, would
seem to be in a state of confusion."

212 P2d 205.

The evidence supplied by the plaintiffs-respondents falls far
below the standard required to invalidate an otherwise effective
contract, particularly if onerejects that parole evidence which
the trial court should have rejected.

Considering the frequent

conflict of testimony at trial, the Ottesons clearly failed to
provide evidence which "reached the point where there remains no
serious or substantial doubt".
The Utah Supreme Court was bound by well-established principles
of equity to look into the facts, as well as the law, of the present
case and to determine if the evidence produced by the Ottesons was
clear and convincing enough to overthrow a simple, forthright
contract.

The Supreme Court properly decided that the evidence

was not of a magnitude to reach this requisite standard.

Therefore,

the Supreme Court was duty bound to reverse the decision of the
trial court and to order specific performance of the Lease and
Option.

Consequently, the decision of the Supreme Court was
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well-founded and in all aspects,
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

proper.

/_Cf-"'-'day

of October,

1978 .
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Frandsen, Keller & J~nsen
Professional Building
90 West 1st North
Price, Utah 84501
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

On this /f&day of October,

1978,

I

mailed three copies of

the foregoing Petition in Opposition to Respondents'

Petition

for Rehearing and Brief in Support of Petition in Opposition to
Petition and Brief for Rehearing by Plaintiffs-Respondents, by
first class mail,
respondents,

postage prepaid thereon,

Donn E.

Cassity and J.

to attorneys for

Steven Newton,

Romney, Nelson

& Cassity, 136 South Main Street, Suite 404, Kearns Building,
Salt Lake City,

Utah 84101.
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